DR Congo seeks United Nations help in disarming Rwanda Liberation Forces

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After years of military collaboration with the group, the Democratic Republic of Congo is now working to dismantle the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, known as Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, or FDLR, is a militia founded by genocidaires.

On 28 July, 2026 the Kinshasa government announced a protocol on disarmament, demobilization and cantonment.

And now the DR Congo President Felix Tshisekedi has written to the United Nation chief asking for backing, a proposal that could be considered in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) mandate renewal.

Western partners in the International Contact Group have urged Kinshasa to adopt a precise timetable and treat MONUSCO as a ‘key partner.’

 Rwanda’s foreign minister has dismissed the protocol as a delaying tactic.

Kigali, on the other hand, appears to be adjusting; not disengaged; its defensive measure in eastern DRC.

On September 29, Rwanda’s UN envoy, Ambassador Martin Ngoga, told the Security Council that Kigali had taken steps to lift its “defensive measures.” But that does not necessarily mean Rwanda considers the FDLR threat resolved.

Previously, President Paul Kagame said on August 24, 2026: “Our problem in Congo has always been FDLR. I can say this 100 times, and if this problem is not resolved, Rwanda will always remain involved.”

The emerging logic appears different:

Kigali may believe AFC/M23 is now capable of keeping FDLR fighters sufficiently far from Rwanda’s borders, allowing Rwanda to reduce its direct military posture without abandoning its core security objective.

This would amount to an adjustment of strategy, not a complete disengagement.

The FDLR remains a central point of contention in the Washington process.

Kinshasa accuses Kigali of obstructing the FDLR neutralization protocol, while Rwanda argues that the mechanism for neutralization and verification remains unresolved.

Meanwhile, fighting and territorial shifts continue across areas including Masisi, Walikale and Kalehe.

AFC/M23’s parallel political and military structures and its significant territorial presence could enable it to assume more of the defensive role previously attributed to Rwanda.

The crucial question is sustainability. Recent reports of FARDC retaking positions from AFC/M23 show that the situation remains fluid.

If Kigali can maintain its security objectives without visible defensive measures presence in eastern DRC, Rwanda could also strengthen its case for easing international pressure and sanctions targeting Rwanda, its military leadership and related entities.