JP Smith, the DA and Cape Town’s criminal underworld: The Black Books, the R8 billion tender shadow and why the Madlanga commission must come to Cape Town

For readers outside Cape Town, this story may sound like another local political fight: a DA safety boss, a police raid, allegations of a smear campaign, opposition parties calling for suspension, and the usual noise between the City and SAPS.

But for those of us who live here, who know the Cape Flats, who understand how power moves through the city, this is not simply about JP Smith. It is about the political underbelly of Cape Town. It is about the relationship between clean-governance branding and dirty procurement realities. It is about gang syndicates, housing contracts, construction mafia networks, private security, Metro Police power, and the unresolved question of whether the DA-led City has been protected from the same scrutiny applied to other metros.

The country is watching the Madlanga Commission expose shocking relationships between criminal networks, police structures, tenders and political influence. We have heard about KwaZulu-Natal, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane, SAPS corruption, metro policing, tender syndicates and the criminal capture of institutions. But the question that burns for many Capetonians is simple: why has Cape Town not been placed under the same national microscope?

Cape Town is not outside South Africa. Cape Town is not too well-managed to be captured. Cape Town is not innocent because it is governed by the DA. If the Madlanga Commission is serious about criminal infiltration of the state, then it must follow the trail to the Western Cape.

At the heart of this matter are three alleged “black books” linked to accused underworld figure Ralph Stanfield. News24 reported that these books were central to the police raid on the offices of JP Smith and Xanthea Limberg in January 2025, and that they allegedly contained daily entries, notes, instructions and payment records. Smith was reported to be among the supposed beneficiaries, alongside former Human Settlements MMC Malusi Booi. The Western Cape High Court later declared the search warrants unlawful and invalid, but the existence and meaning of the books remain politically and institutionally explosive.  

That distinction is important.

A defective warrant does not automatically make the underlying questions disappear. If the black books are fake, fabricated, contaminated or misread, then those responsible must be exposed. But if they contain authentic traces of financial relationships between gang-linked figures, public officials, political intermediaries and city-linked procurement networks, then Cape Town may be facing one of the most serious municipal capture scandals of the democratic era.

1. Cape Town’s Political Underbelly Did Not Begin Yesterday

To understand this story, one must understand Cape Town.

Cape Town has always had two cities. There is the postcard city: Table Mountain, the Waterfront, vineyards, beaches, clean audits, tourism rankings and DA press statements. Then there is the other Cape Town: the Cape Flats, forced removals, spatial apartheid, divide and mis-rule,drug economies, gang turf, political patronage, informers, fear, assassinations, extortion, police corruption and abandoned communities.

Gangsterism in Cape Town is not merely a crime problem. It is a historical political economy.

During apartheid, gangs were tolerated, manipulated and sometimes weaponised in communities where political resistance was strong. Remember Apartheid third force operated through destabilisation, informers, selective policing, social fragmentation and the deliberate weakening of community self-organisation. The result was that gangsterism became embedded in the social and economic fabric of many working-class Coloured and African communities.

After 1994, the gangs did not disappear. They adapted.

They moved from street violence into protection rackets. From drug corners into construction sites. From intimidation into subcontracting. From neighbourhood fear into formal company registration. From criminal economy into public procurement.

This is the critical shift.

The modern Cape Town gangster is not only the man with a gun. He may also be the man behind a company, a security subcontract, a construction vehicle, a housing project, a fuel supplier, a lawyer, a consultant, a political contact and a municipal insider.

That is why the Stanfield matter is so important.

2. The 28s, Ralph Stanfield and the Move Into Formal Contracts

Ralph Stanfield has long been described in reporting as an alleged 28s gang boss. He and Nicole Johnson have been associated with a growing web of criminal and business allegations. In May 2025, the National Prosecuting Authority stated that Stanfield, Johnson and others would be indicted in the Western Cape High Court on gang-related offences under POCA, together with predicate offences including the murders of Wendy Kloppers, Rashied Staggie, William Stevens, Faizel Adams and Ismail Abrahams.  

That list alone should stop South Africa in its tracks.

Wendy Kloppers was a City of Cape Town official killed at a housing development site. Rashied Staggie was a former Hard Livings gang boss. William “Red” Stevens was linked to the 27s. These are not abstract names. They point to a violent underworld where murder, control of territory, control of projects and control of money intersect. Eyewitness News reported that the prosecution accused Stanfield, Johnson and others of involvement in murders and other crimes under POCA, including Kloppers and Staggie.  

This is why the Cape Town story cannot be reduced to “JP Smith versus SAPS”.

The deeper issue is whether elements of the criminal economy entered the City’s housing and procurement system.

3. The R8 Billion Tender Shadow

One of the most explosive claims in the public record concerns the blocking of 27 companies allegedly linked to Stanfield from contracts reportedly totalling R8 billion. Daily Maverick reported that JP Smith said the city manager had managed to block 27 companies allegedly linked to Stanfield from contracts worth R8 billion.  

This figure must not be allowed to float in the air.

R8 billion is not gossip. R8 billion is a city-shaping amount of money. R8 billion can build homes, roads, clinics, community facilities, infrastructure and livelihoods. If companies linked to an alleged underworld network were positioned to access contracts of that scale, then every serious democrat, journalist, civic leader and law enforcement agency should ask: how did they get so close? How were they allowed to secure City of Cape Town contracts for so long and for so much by a so-called ‘Clean Governance’ of the Democratic Alliance?

Who opened the door?

Who checked the company documents?

Who verified beneficial ownership?

Who sat on bid committees?

Who recommended awards?

Who ignored red flags?

Who received threats?

Who received money?

Who protected the system?

And who is now trying to narrow the issue into a technical dispute about a warrant?

4. The City Housing Department: Where the Tender Door Opened

The tenders at the centre of this saga were not awarded by the ANC. They were not awarded by Luthuli House. They were not awarded by a national department in Pretoria.

They emerged within the DA-led municipal and provincial governance ecosystem, especially around housing and construction.

This matters because housing is one of the most vulnerable areas of government procurement. A housing site is not only a development project. It is a local political economy. It involves land, beneficiaries, contractors, subcontractors, site security, transport, building materials, local labour, ward politics and community expectations. That makes it a perfect point of entry for organised crime.

The method is often simple.

A gang-linked network does not need to own the whole contract at first. It can enter through “security”. Then it demands subcontracting. Then it controls access to the site. Then it intimidates competitors. Then it pressures officials. Then it builds relationships with political intermediaries. Then it launders legitimacy through registered companies.

Eventually, the gangster does not need to stand at the gate. The company does.

This is why the City’s blacklisting of companies linked to Nicole Johnson is so significant. Daily Maverick reported in December 2023 that the City had blacklisted seven companies linked to Johnson, whose husband is alleged 28s gang boss Ralph Stanfield.   News24 similarly reported that City manager Lungelo Mbandazayo said the metro had blacklisted seven companies linked to Johnson.  

But blacklisting raises its own question: why only then?

If there was long-standing public reporting, criminal suspicion, known association and site-level intimidation, why were these companies able to enter the municipal ecosystem in the first place?

5. The Companies and the Network

Public reporting has repeatedly mentioned Glomix House Brokers as one of the key entities. Investigative Journalism Hub reported that Glomix was among companies blacklisted by the City and National Treasury, and that the blacklisting was linked to Johnson. The same report said the restriction remains in effect until March 2034.   Daily Maverick also reported that Glomix was blacklisted by Treasury, while noting that the City had earlier confirmed blacklisting seven companies linked to Johnson based on reputational risk.  

Other names reported in relation to the broader business network include Boon Group, NJ Diesel Distributors and Globoon Joint Venture. These names matter not because one can declare guilt by association, but because they show the importance of mapping company structures, directors, joint ventures, addresses, related-party relationships and tender histories.

Cape Town needs a public register of every flagged company.

Not a vague statement. Not a press release.

A register.

It must include company names, directors, beneficial owners, tender numbers, project names, contract values, departments, bid committee dates, payments made, project status, reasons for blacklisting or blocking, and whether any officials were disciplined.

Without that, “we blocked 27 companies” becomes political theatre rather than accountability.

6. Malusi Booi Was Not an Isolated Event

Former DA Human Settlements MMC Malusi Booi is central to this story. His office was raided in 2023. He was later arrested in 2024 in connection with a housing tender fraud case linked to Stanfield. In May 2025, charges linked to the commercial case were provisionally withdrawn while investigations continued into newly discovered evidence, but the NPA made it clear that the wider gang-related prosecution remained alive.  

The DA wants the public to see Booi as a contained scandal: one bad apple, one portfolio, one politician, one disciplinary matter.

That is too neat.

The question is not only whether Booi did wrong. The question is whether the system around him enabled wrong to happen.

A mayoral committee member cannot alone create a procurement ecosystem. Officials process documents. Bid committees sit. Legal departments review. Political principals supervise. City managers approve or block. Contractors invoice. Payments are made. Sites are monitored. Security risks are reported. Whistleblowers speak. Councillors know what is happening in wards.

If gang-linked companies were close to large-scale housing contracts, then the system either failed or was compromised.

Both possibilities are serious.

7. JP Smith and the Law-and-Order Contradiction

JP Smith has long presented himself as Cape Town’s crime-fighting political face. He has pushed a hard line on enforcement, criticised SAPS, demanded policing devolution and overseen the City’s growing safety and security machinery.

But that is precisely why the allegations around the black books matter.

The public is entitled to ask: how does a city with such a powerful safety narrative end up with alleged gang-linked companies near billions in contracts?

How does a City that claims to understand crime intelligence fail to detect the political economy of construction mafia activity early enough?

How does a government that says it is tough on gangs allow companies linked to alleged gang figures into housing delivery?

How does a safety boss call the raid a smear campaign without fully accounting for the deeper tender trail within his own administration?

To be clear: Smith denies wrongdoing. The High Court found the warrants unlawful. These facts must be respected. But there is a difference between legal vindication on a warrant and political accountability for the ecosystem in which the allegations arose.

Smith’s own public claim that 27 companies linked to Stanfield were blocked from R8 billion in contracts should make him a witness to a much bigger story, not merely a victim of one.

8. Metro Police Budgets: More Money, Less Safety?

Every year, Cape Town’s safety and security budget is presented as evidence of seriousness. More officers. More equipment. More technology. More CCTV. More enforcement. More vehicles. More operational capacity.

But the outcome question remains.

Are communities safer?

Has gang power declined?

Has extortion reduced?

Are housing sites protected?

Are whistleblowers safe?

Are construction projects free from intimidation?

Are murder networks being dismantled?

Or has Cape Town built a visible enforcement system that is strong against the poor but weak against organised criminal capital?

This is the uncomfortable question.

There is a growing perception that Cape Town operates through a hybrid security model: Metro Police, law enforcement, private security, neighbourhood watches, improvement districts, surveillance providers and tactical units. Some of this may be lawful and necessary. But without transparent oversight, such a system can become opaque, politically useful and vulnerable to abuse.

The question for the Madlanga Commission is direct: is Cape Town’s municipal security architecture being used only to fight crime, or has it also become part of a political-security economy that protects certain interests while projecting toughness?

9. Private Security, Intelligence and the Fear of a Parallel System

Cape Town has a large private security footprint. In wealthy suburbs, business districts and tourist zones, private security is often more visible than SAPS. In poorer communities, enforcement often appears as raids, confiscations, evictions or tactical operations.

This unequal security geography creates a deeper democratic problem.

Who controls intelligence?

Who shares information?

Who influences deployments?

Who decides which threats matter?

Who monitors private security relationships with politicians, developers, contractors and city officials?

In a city where construction mafia activity, gang violence and procurement influence overlap, private security cannot be treated as neutral background infrastructure. It must be examined as part of the power map.

If gang-linked companies can enter construction, they can enter security. If politically connected actors can influence policing narratives, they can influence surveillance priorities. If Metro Police and private security operate with weak oversight, then the danger is not only crime. The danger is a parallel security state.

That is why this matter belongs before a commission.

10. The Black Books: How the Alleged System Works

For ordinary readers, let us explain the meaning of the “black books”.

In criminal networks, money is power, but memory is protection. Ledgers record who received what, who must be paid, who can be trusted, who must be pressured, and who has become useful. These books can contain initials, nicknames, amounts, instructions, dates and project references. They may not look like formal accounting documents, but they can reveal a pattern of influence.

If the alleged Stanfield black books contain cash-flow references between gang figures and city-linked actors, then investigators must follow every line.

Not selectively.

Every line.

That means comparing the books with bank records, cellphone data, tender awards, municipal meeting dates, project payments, political events, travel, lifestyle changes and company registrations.

That is how one moves from allegation to evidence.

The public does not need gossip. The public needs forensic truth.

11. Why “ANC Plot” Is Too Convenient

The claim that this is an ANC political plot must be tested against reality.

The ANC has not governed the City of Cape Town for well over a decade. It has not controlled the Western Cape provincial government. It does not sit inside the City’s bid committees. It did not award City housing contracts. It does not manage Cape Town’s safety and security directorate.

Yes, SAPS is national. Yes, SAPS has political problems. Yes, police factions exist. Yes, warrants can be abused. Yes, the Smith raid was later declared unlawful.

But none of that answers the core question: how did gang-linked business networks get so close to City contracts?

Blaming the ANC may work as communication strategy. It does not work as forensic explanation.

The black books did not originate from an ANC press conference. The housing contracts were not issued by ANC councillors. The blacklisted companies were not blacklisted by the ANC. The murdered officials were not imaginary.

Cape Town must stop hiding behind comparative politics.

12. Why the Madlanga Commission Must Come to Cape Town

The Madlanga Commission has forced South Africa to confront the relationship between crime, police power, politics and procurement. That same framework must now be applied to Cape Town.

Its expanded terms should include:

1. The 27 allegedly blocked Stanfield-linked companies and the reported R8 billion contract exposure.
2. The seven blacklisted Johnson-linked companies.
3. All housing projects affected by extortion, intimidation, murder or contractor withdrawal.
4. The black books and any alleged cash flows involving public officials or political figures.
5. Metro Police budget growth and actual safety outcomes.
6. Private security contracts and their relationships with city operations.
7. The role of municipal officials who resisted gang-linked procurement and whether they were protected.
8. Whether any political actors benefited from, protected or ignored the criminal economy.

This is not an anti-DA request. It is a pro-accountability demand.

If Cape Town is clean, the Commission will confirm it.

If Cape Town is compromised, the people deserve to know.

Conclusion: The Mountain Must Not Become a Curtain

The real victims are not politicians whose offices are raided. The real victims are the residents of Valhalla Park, Delft, Manenberg, Hanover Park, Mitchells Plain, Bonteheuwel, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha, Elsies River and Bishop Lavis.

They live with the consequences of a city where gangs are not only on street corners but allegedly near contracts, security systems, political relationships and public money.

The DA cannot demand accountability elsewhere and plead conspiracy at home.

JP Smith cannot be both the champion of law and order and exempt from hard questions about the safety system he helped build.

The City cannot claim clean governance while refusing to publish the full procurement trail.

And South Africa cannot allow Cape Town’s postcard image to hide its political underbelly.

The black books must be tested.

The contracts must be opened.

The money must be followed.

The murdered must not be forgotten.

The Madlanga Commission must come to Cape Town.

Because the question is no longer whether gangsters are outside the gates of government.

The question is whether some of them were invited in through the tender door.