Will Gen. Saleh’s consociationalism work where other approaches failed?
Gen. Salim Saleh, one of Uganda’s most influential political and military figures, has recently emerged with a proposal to mediate between government and various opposition political forces to address the political divisions threatening the country’s stability. His recent remarks are particularly interesting because they touch on two sensitive issues: the welfare and treatment of Col. […] The post Will Gen. Saleh’s consociationalism work where other approaches failed? appeared first on The Observer Media Ltd.


Gen. Salim Saleh, one of Uganda’s most influential political and military figures, has recently emerged with a proposal to mediate between government and various opposition political forces to address the political divisions threatening the country’s stability.
His recent remarks are particularly interesting because they touch on two sensitive issues: the welfare and treatment of Col. (Rtd) Dr Kizza Besigye, President Museveni’s longstanding political rival, and the broader question of how Uganda can navigate its political future without passing its historical animosities to another generation.
Saleh has expressed concern that today’s young people should not inherit what he describes as “generational quarrels”.
Saleh retired from active military service many years ago, largely operating outside mainstream electoral politics, and concentrating instead on business.
But his proximity to power makes him an important political actor, particularly when government finds itself confronted with difficulties. Saleh was previously associated with efforts to explore a peaceful resolution to the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict, which devastated northern Uganda for decades.
Joseph Kony remains at large, but northern Uganda has experienced a remarkable return to normalcy. Without a doubt, Saleh wields considerable influence, particularly at moments when President Museveni’s administration is perceived by its critics as indifferent, detached, or excessively punitive towards the opposition.
In his role, whether formal or informal, as a mediator, Saleh introduces an interesting political proposition. Drawing on the advice and intellectual contribution of Prof. Ogenga Otunnu, Saleh argues that Uganda’s political disagreements could best be addressed through consociational democracy.
At first glance, the proposal seems like a new pitch being sold to Ugandans. However, consociationalism shares key features with earlier models and does not represent a fundamentally different approach.
Uganda has experimented with political alliances, one-party states, the Movement political system, political co-optation, the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD), and various other arrangements intended to bring opposing political interests under a single national umbrella, but has failed.
On paper, consociationalism sounds reasonable. Indeed, it is difficult to argue against political inclusion, equitable representation and the protection of minority interests. In modern political discourse, consociationalism is largely shaped by Arend Lijphart’s four pillars – grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy.
These have become influential values among peace architects seeking to resolve political conflicts. Paradoxically, it is these very principles that expose the weaknesses of consociationalism.
I have not read Prof. Otunnu’s purported paper. However, if Saleh and associates intend to apply Lijphart’s model as a pathway to lasting peace among Uganda’s deeply divided political groups, consociationalism risks becoming yet another political hoax.
Take the grand coalition, for instance. Scholars regard it as a central pillar of consociationalism, a position Prof. Otunnu has also publicly acknowledged. Yet, in practice, coalitions often become elite cartels, with political leaders bargaining among themselves while inadequately representing the interests of ordinary citizens.
A few cases in Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrate this point. Elite dominance in those countries has not entirely helped resolve exclusion, inequality, and institutional weakness.
South Africa’s transition combined two distinct mechanisms: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, which addressed past abuses, and a consociational power-sharing arrangement, which did not endure beyond the interim period. Tutu’s commission offers a cautionary lesson.
By focusing largely on human rights violations, without accountability, it failed to confront apartheid’s economic legacy of land dispossession, unequal education, employment discrimination and concentrated wealth.
Winnie Mandela’s scepticism towards Tutu’s commission reflected these concerns. Today, similar grievances inform sections of South African society that regard Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu as major sellouts.
Failure to address structural injustice has left deep inequalities largely intact, fuelling persistent poverty and social divisions, including xenophobia we witness today. Uganda’s political history has produced perpetrators and victims whose experiences warrant public reckoning.
Yet Saleh’s mediation efforts risk overlooking a vital dimension of justice. As South Africa shows, consociational models often prioritise political reconciliation over formal accountability, leaving most victims of state violence without the answers they seek.
The second pillar of Lijphart’s consociational framework, mutual veto, seeks to restrain majority power by allowing minority groups to block decisions that threaten their interests.
Uganda’s Constituent Assembly offers a lesson for Saleh’s proposal. Comprising 214 elected and 70 appointed delegates, the 284-member Assembly produced the 1995 Constitution.
Yet, NRM dominance during deliberations, walkouts and unresolved political disagreements exposed the difficulty of accommodating competing interests. That failure to compromise on critical national issues continues to blight Uganda’s politics.
Who doesn’t remember how the removal of presidential term limits in 2005 and age limits in 2017 further intensified political tensions? The question for Saleh is simple: what guarantees will ensure that the proposed arrangement gives minority groups a meaningful veto over government excesses?
The third pillar of Lijphart’s framework, proportionality, seeks equitable representation and resource allocation among competing political groups. It counters winner-takes-all politics, where one side’s gains come at the expense of another.
NRM’s longstanding emphasis on parliamentary numbers raises questions about consociationalism. Allegations of electoral manipulation, gerrymandering through creating more districts, and fielding opposition spoiler candidates have repeatedly fuelled concerns about political competition.
In Parliament, NRM’s numerical dominance has often favoured majoritarian decision-making over consensus. Without credible proportional representation and meaningful inclusion of competing political interests, Saleh’s proposed consociational arrangement risks being dead on arrival.
The fourth pillar of Lijphart’s consociational framework, segmental autonomy, allows distinct groups to manage their internal affairs without undue interference. In Uganda, this finds little practical expression.
Opposition parties operate under intense scrutiny, often accompanied by crackdowns that deepen political animosity rather than accommodate difference.
Such conditions erode the mutual trust on which power-sharing depends, and any consociational arrangement would, therefore, struggle to take root unless this underlying political environment changed.
In Uganda, consociationalism’s unresolved ambiguities raise doubts about its suitability as a conflict-resolution model. Its elite-centred power-sharing risks weakening democratic competition and accountability by concentrating bargaining among a few powerful actors. Uganda needs genuine justice and inclusive democracy, not elite accommodation.
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