High Court rejects fresh evidence in Banjulinding land dispute
The dispute stems from Suit No. SC/007/2019 between Lamin Jarju, with Momodou L. Jarju Rongo as legal representative, and Momodou Lungs Jarju, acting Alkalo of Banjulinding Village. The plaintiff had earlier obtained judgment for declaration of title to land and a perpetual injunction. The 2nd Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court, where he sought to tender fresh evidence he claimed would have affected the trial outcome. Justice Akinbiyi applied the three conditions set out in Ladd v. Marshal (1954), consistently followed by Gambian courts: non-availability with reasonable diligence, relevance and credibility, and reliability. The court found that a declaration document dated June 1, 2016, and historical narratives dated August 3, 2016, failed the test. Both were created by the appellant himself during and after trial. “This violates the first principle in Ladd v. Marshall that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence,” the judge said. She cited Ogunleye v. Oni (2012), noting a party cannot claim evidence was unavailable when he had capacity to produce it during trial. The documents, she added, were “after thoughts designed to remedy deficiencies in the Appellant’s case.” Other documents, including colonial pictures from 1945, sketch plans from 1975 to 2007, appointment letters, correspondence, tax receipts, and land transfers from 2009 and 2011, were also rejected. The court held that all existed before or during trial and the appellant showed no reason why they could not have been tendered then. Many were within his possession or control. On relevance under Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act 1994, Justice Akinbiyi questioned the connection of 1945 colonial pictures to a 2016 land dispute. Citing Alhaji Shehu v. Alhaji Aabobacarr (2017), she said evidence must have direct bearing on the issue to be admissible. The appellant argued that because the Supreme Court allowed amendment of pleadings, the respondent was estopped from objecting. The court dismissed this as “clearly misconceived,” stressing the Supreme Court remitted the matter for determination, not automatic admission. “Leave to amend pleadings does not determine admissibility of evidence,” Justice Akinbiyi ruled, citing Ogunbuyi v. Ogunbuyi (2016). The judge held that admitting the documents would prejudice the respondent, who had secured judgment after full trial. “Litigation must come to an end, and parties cannot be allowed to introduce evidence piecemeal,” she said, referencing Obi v. Obi (2018). Upholding the respondent’s objections, the court struck out the declaration document, historical narratives, colonial pictures, sketch plans, letters, tax receipts, land transfers, and other listed documents. Costs of D5,000 was awarded to the respondent. The file was remitted to the Registry for necessary action.
Black News 
The dispute stems from Suit No. SC/007/2019 between Lamin Jarju, with Momodou L. Jarju Rongo as legal representative, and Momodou Lungs Jarju, acting Alkalo of Banjulinding Village. The plaintiff had earlier obtained judgment for declaration of title to land and a perpetual injunction. The 2nd Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court, where he sought to tender fresh evidence he claimed would have affected the trial outcome.
Justice Akinbiyi applied the three conditions set out in Ladd v. Marshal (1954), consistently followed by Gambian courts: non-availability with reasonable diligence, relevance and credibility, and reliability.
The court found that a declaration document dated June 1, 2016, and historical narratives dated August 3, 2016, failed the test. Both were created by the appellant himself during and after trial. “This violates the first principle in Ladd v. Marshall that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence,” the judge said. She cited Ogunleye v. Oni (2012), noting a party cannot claim evidence was unavailable when he had capacity to produce it during trial. The documents, she added, were “after thoughts designed to remedy deficiencies in the Appellant’s case.”
Other documents, including colonial pictures from 1945, sketch plans from 1975 to 2007, appointment letters, correspondence, tax receipts, and land transfers from 2009 and 2011, were also rejected. The court held that all existed before or during trial and the appellant showed no reason why they could not have been tendered then. Many were within his possession or control.
On relevance under Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act 1994, Justice Akinbiyi questioned the connection of 1945 colonial pictures to a 2016 land dispute. Citing Alhaji Shehu v. Alhaji Aabobacarr (2017), she said evidence must have direct bearing on the issue to be admissible.
The appellant argued that because the Supreme Court allowed amendment of pleadings, the respondent was estopped from objecting. The court dismissed this as “clearly misconceived,” stressing the Supreme Court remitted the matter for determination, not automatic admission. “Leave to amend pleadings does not determine admissibility of evidence,” Justice Akinbiyi ruled, citing Ogunbuyi v. Ogunbuyi (2016).
The judge held that admitting the documents would prejudice the respondent, who had secured judgment after full trial. “Litigation must come to an end, and parties cannot be allowed to introduce evidence piecemeal,” she said, referencing Obi v. Obi (2018).
Upholding the respondent’s objections, the court struck out the declaration document, historical narratives, colonial pictures, sketch plans, letters, tax receipts, land transfers, and other listed documents.
Costs of D5,000 was awarded to the respondent. The file was remitted to the Registry for necessary action.
